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Abstract: This chapter sheds light on interaction (samhandling) between scientists 
and politicians. What happens when the latter gives the former a role in an effort to  
ensure that society is not exposed to an unforeseen calamity? The chapter has two 
objectives – one conceptual and one pertaining to the analysis of public policy in a 
particular context. First, distinctions are drawn between three dimensions of uncer-
tainty about the consequences of action. The aim is to create a clearer understanding 
of what is meant by assertions that policy is made under conditions of uncertainty. 
Secondly, the political implications of uncertainty are charted with particular refer-
ence to the choice of climate policy. The analysis targets the way the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has handled the task of publicizing the 
effect that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases have on the atmosphere. 
The conclusion is that the IPCC’s communication with politicians and the public 
has contributed to, rather than ameliorated, the problem of uncertainty that stands 
in the way of resolute political action.
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Normative questions about what we ought to do bring descriptive ques-
tions about matters of fact in their wake. This is because the consequences 
of our actions depend, to a greater or lesser extent, on what goes on else-
where, outside our control. Uncertainty about such matters is apt to stand 
in the way of resolute action. 
In this chapter, I shall first argue that the problem of uncertainty has sev-
eral aspects. Indeed, it is no single problem, but a triad of what I shall call 
bewilderment, ignorance and scientific inconclusiveness. Secondly, I shall 
discuss the role of science in dealing with bewilderment and ignorance. I 
pay particular attention to research into the cause of climate change. The 
aim of the article is to shed light on the interaction between scientists and 
politicians. What happens when the latter gives the former a role in an 
effort to ensure that society is not exposed to an unforeseen calamity? 
A brief introduction to the issue of climate change and the choice of cli-
mate policy is in order. Political authorities would like to know how human 
activity affects the earth’s climate in order to decide whether anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases should be reduced or allowed to continue at, 
or above, their current level. What is achieved by adopting one or the other 
course of action depends crucially on what goes on in the atmosphere. On 
the one hand, the effect of doing nothing, or not much, to lower emissions 
may be grave. The greenhouse theory says that greenhouse gases have an 
appreciable effect on the climate of the earth. If so, continued emissions 
at the current level are dangerous. On the other hand, reducing emissions 
may be costly, too. This, at any rate, is the opinion of many economists. If 
they are right, there is good reason to dispense with reductions unless they 
will contribute to stabilizing the climate. Let us assume that they are right. 
Let us also assume that the consequences of climate change may turn out 
to be far worse, at least in certain parts of the world, than any economic 
hardship anyone will suffer owing to reductions of emissions. Most of the 
subsequent argument will be unaffected if we drop the latter assumption, 
but it plays a crucial role towards the end of what follows.
An important conclusion is that scientific opinion about climate 
change has influenced parts of political opinion in a way that belies the 
scientists’ best intentions. Their presentation of results from research was 
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meant to counteract the reluctance of political agents – leaders as well as 
people at large – to do something about the dangers of climate change. 
This may well have produced the opposite effect. 
Bewilderment
We – or those of us who are not well versed in atmospheric chemistry – 
do not know what to believe about anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases. We are uncertain in the psychological sense of the word. Uncertainty, 
thus conceived, is a state of mind – a doxastic attitude – and it amounts to 
the absence of wholehearted belief. With regard to the matter at hand, we 
cannot judge that things are definitely thus or so. I shall call it bewilderment.
To arrive at a more precise definition, consider an episode in Shake-
speare’s Othello. Night falls on Venice and Brabantio, a nobleman, is at 
home. So, he believes, is his daughter; indeed, he is certain that she is at 
home. He has a full belief. Then consider Hamlet. In the tragedy that bears 
his name, he has just lost his father, who was King of Denmark, and he 
suspects murder was committed at the behest of the Queen and the late 
King’s brother. But he is by no means sure. After all, the body was found 
lying in a garden where poisonous snakes live. Hamlet has no full belief, 
only a partial one. In general, to have a partial belief in a proposition, P, is 
to attach greater likelihood to P than any contrary proposition – i.e. any 
proposition that entails the denial of P – but some likelihood to at least 
one contrary proposition. As Hamlet sees it, murder is the likelier of two 
explanations that both have some likelihood.
Partial belief can border on full belief. Suppose, for example, that I 
peer out of the window and see people in their shirtsleeves. This gives 
me reason to believe that the weather is warm. As it happens, however, 
the past week has been unseasonably cold and perhaps these people have 
taken off their jackets in protest against the weather, as it were. What I see 
favors the first hypothesis, but does not rule the latter out of court. I have 
a partial belief that is nearly full.
Partial belief can also be distant from full belief. Let’s say that I wonder 
whether my daughter will go right home after school to take our dog out 
for a walk. She said she would, but it is a beautiful day, so perhaps she will 
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succumb to the temptation of hanging out with some friends. Only by a 
small margin does one proposition (“she will go right home”) surpass its 
negation (“she won’t”) in terms of likelihood. My partial belief borders on 
refusal to accord the former a higher probability than the latter. I am, in 
other words, on the verge of suspending judgment.
In view of these distinctions, we may refine the account of bewilder-
ment. To be bewildered about something is to have a partial belief about 
it or, at the limit, no belief at all. The latter amounts to suspension of 
judgment. Short of that, bewilderment comes in degrees. The further we 
are from full belief, the greater our bewilderment. In the second last para-
graph, I invoked a case of mild bewilderment, whereas the last paragraph 
portrayed me as very bewildered. 
Bewilderment is a problem from a practical point of view. It is apt to 
stand in the way of resolute action. One is naturally reluctant to choose 
an alternative that does not match up with a clear-cut consequence. 
Reluctance is apt to vary with the distance from full belief. The more 
unsure one is about what a given alternative leads to, the less keen one 
is to choose it, all things being equal. Reluctance fostered by uncertainty 
presumably reaches its highest level when judgment is suspended.
Ignorance
Suppose someone has a full belief. She may, for example, stand before 
a choice and feel certain about what an alternative has in store for her. 
There is no doubt in her mind. All the same, she can be out of her depth. 
Certainty, to quote Wittgenstein (1972:6e), is “a tone of voice in which 
one declares how things are, but one does not infer from the tone of voice 
that one is justified.” To be certain but not knowledgeable about a certain 
subject at the same time is no feat (not, at any rate, if experience from my 
life is anything to go on).
Being knowledgeable is no state of mind, but an epistemic position. It 
consists in being aware of how things really are. This, too, is a kind of cer-
tainty. Similarly, being unknowledgeable is a kind of uncertainty. Call it 
ignorance. I shall offer a more refined account of it after briefly digressing 
on the topic of truth.
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The term “truth” stands for a relation between a representation and 
some matter of fact. Say the representation is verbal – a written account, 
for example. It is true if, and only if, it depicts things as they are. In par-
ticular, the assertion that X causes Y is a true explanation of Y, provided 
Y really owes its occurrence to X. David Hillel-Ruben (1991:210) makes 
the point cumbrously: “Explanations work, when they do, only in vir-
tue of underlying determinative or dependency structural relations in 
the world.” Jon Elster (2017:24) puts it pithily: “A genuine explanation 
accounts for what happened, as it happened.”
Elster (ibid.:25) adds, “Why would anyone want to come up with a 
purely conjectural account of an event?” This statement, however, is apt to 
invite misunderstanding. Nothing contrasts more starkly with guesswork 
than truth revealed, but mere conjecture and certified truth are extremes. 
Between them is the immensely important category of representations 
that are conjectural but credible. They constitute promising candidates 
for truth. Their importance derives from the fact that we do not search 
for truth the way we search for, say, a word to rhyme with another. One 
can tell whether words rhyme by comparing them to one another, but no 
proposition permits straightforward comparison with reality. Going after 
truth is a more roundabout matter. 
In Colin McGinn’s words, there is “no more to the injunction to seek 
the truth than to respect the evidence”, not because “there is no distinc-
tion between evidence and truth”, but because “our position as cognitive 
agents is confined to that of evaluators of evidence” (McGinn 2003:72). 
This dictum needs some fleshing out. I take it that “evidence” stands for 
information, in particular, perceptual information.1 Not for nothing, 
McGinn speaks of the evaluation, rather than collection, of it. We do not 
just register bits and pieces of evidence; we scrutinize information before 
it can serve as a cue to the truth. Documents, for example, are assessed for 
authenticity. A further and more notable complication is that informa-
tional value can be boosted by means of reasoning. Here is an illustration 
1 “Evidence” sometimes has a more inclusive meaning. It may stand for what I will soon talk about 
under the head of “epistemic considerations”. McGinn’s use of “evidence” seems to be in line with 
mine rather than the more inclusive meaning, but it does not matter if I am wrong on this score. 
The substance of what I am going to say will be unaffected. 
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of how this works. After Beethoven had lost his hearing, he carried note-
books about with him, in which people he met wrote down what they 
said to him. His own contributions to the conversations are mostly unre-
corded, but the written record, together with background knowledge of 
the life and times of the composer, permit credible conjectures. We may 
fill out the blanks by asking what Beethoven is likely to have said that elic-
ited the responses he got. Similarly, to turn to science for an illustration, 
we can figure out the chemical composition of stars by inference, from 
observations of the frequency and pattern of light rays. It is a question 
of abductive inference, which, schematically put, goes like this: (i) there 
is evidence that Y is the case; (ii) the best explanation of Y is that X is the 
case; hence (iii) X is the case. Evidence is one kind of pointer to truth and 
abductive inference is another. There are yet others, notably inductive 
inference. We can call them collectively epistemic considerations. 
Now we are equipped to restate McGinn’s dictum. In practice, there 
is no more to the injunction to seek the truth than to respect epistemic 
considerations, not because there is no distinction between propositions 
that rest on epistemic considerations and propositions that are true, but 
because there is no better way of getting at the truth than respecting epis-
temic considerations. This, in turn, equips me for refining the definition 
of ignorance. To be ignorant about something is to form a belief about 
it without paying sufficient attention to epistemic considerations. Like 
bewilderment, ignorance is a matter of degree, running the whole gamut 
from a mild lack of attention to epistemic considerations to pronounced 
inattentiveness. In other words, the evidence for, and the reasoning 
behind, a certain belief can leave a little or a lot to be desired. 
Consider Brabantio again. He is certain that his daughter is at home. 
Enter Iago and Roderigo, who tell him that the girl has eloped with a 
lover. Brabantio does not believe what they say, but searches the house 
and then realizes that he is wrong: “It is too true an evil, gone she is.” 
(Shakespeare Othello scene 1, act 1) Both before and after the search, 
Brabantio has a full belief. Beforehand, he is certain that his daughter is at 
home; afterwards, he is certain that she is not. Psychologically speaking, 
the two states of mind are akin to one another. Both bespeak confidence. 
But epistemologically speaking, they differ. The original belief is, if not 
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flippant, at least careless. It is replaced by one that rests on a propitious 
way of getting at truth – or, more accurately, a well-suited way of inquir-
ing into someone’s whereabouts. It is not that by going and looking for 
a person at a certain site one is certain to find out whether or not she is 
there, but the procedure is promising to a tee.
Then consider Hamlet for a second time. The basis for the partial belief 
he holds when the play begins is flimsy. What makes him suspect that 
his father was murdered is the hasty marriage between his uncle and his 
mother. (I disregard the nightly appearances of his father’s ghost.) It may 
well have been improper of the two to wed so soon, but it hardly indicates 
that they are murderers. Hamlet is on thin epistemic ice; his case is a para-
digm of ignorance. Later, however, he conducts an ingenious experiment. 
He arranges for a group of travelling actors to stage a tragedy about regi-
cide in the presence of his uncle. The new King reacts with evident horror 
when the players enact the murder scene. This fortifies Hamlet’s suspi-
cions. His doxastic attitude still falls short of a full belief, but now reflects 
attentiveness to epistemic considerations. He is no longer ignorant.
Scientific inclusiveness
It is in the nature of scientific inquiry to help with the problem of igno-
rance. I take this claim to be uncontroversial. Not only will I refrain from 
defending it; I will give it a rhetorical lift by borrowing a couple of felic-
itous phrases from Jonathan Bennett. Ordinary, untutored belief about 
matters of complexity tends to be based on “scanty reasoning about a 
small set of empirical data”, whereas science offers “thorough reasoning 
about a rich set of empirical data” (Bennett 2016:15). 
In contrast, it is not in the nature of science to help with the problem 
of bewilderment. The transition from untutored belief to belief that takes 
its cue from scientific inquiry is as likely to exacerbate as alleviate that 
problem. When we are presented with a rich set of varied evidence and 
become privy to ingenious reasoning, we may not be capable of forming 
a full belief or retaining one we had in advance.
In view of this, I shall define one more conception of uncertainty. 
Suppose that no full belief emanates from scientific inquiry about some 
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matter of fact. Science warrants only partial belief of what takes place or 
no belief at all. Then there exists scientific inconclusiveness. Conversely, 
when science puts doubt to rest, scientific conclusiveness is achieved. In 
the previous paragraph, I suggested that both upshots of enquiry are nor-
mal, which is not to say that they are equally welcome. The purpose of 
science is, after all, to get at truth. Only scientific conclusiveness bespeaks 
success in this respect (but does not, of course, guarantee it). Scientific 
inconclusiveness does away with ignorance, which is fine, but leaves us in 
a state of bewilderment, which is not so fine, as it is apt to hinder resolute 
action.
Combatting and exacerbating bewilderment
In the remainder of the article, I shall turn to research on climate change 
in order to extract some more specific lessons about the role of science 
in dealing with ignorance and bewilderment. Political authorities have 
engaged scientific experts to help with the question of whether or not 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases affect the climate in ways 
that are dangerous. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) is a network of scientists whose task is, among other things, to 
sort this question out. What have these scientists done for us?
To all appearances, the IPCC has helped with the problem of uncer-
tainty-cum-ignorance. Quibbles about the quality of its successive reports 
notwithstanding, they firmly belong to the category of thorough reason-
ing about a rich set of empirical data. It appears, moreover, that the IPCC 
is also intent on helping with the problem of uncertainty-cum-bewilder-
ment. Consider a statement by John Houghton, who has been chairper-
son of Working Group 1 – one of the three constituent working groups: 
… our work was rather like the making of a weather forecast. It is of little help 
for a forecaster to say that the weather will change tomorrow but that he is un-
willing to say in what way. The forecaster also needs to give his best estimate of 
the detail of that change. (Houghton 1990:6)
To be sure, the statement is ambiguous. On the one hand, Houghton urges 
scientists to be precise and not to tell things approximately when exactness 
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is feasible. Saying simply that the weather will change is inadvisable, if not 
irresponsible, if one has reason to believe that incumbent change will take 
this or that particular shape. This is a pertinent but trite admonishment. 
On the other hand, Houghton also admonishes that scientists commit 
themselves to a full belief. He suggests that a weather forecast is useless for 
practical purposes unless the forecaster comes up with a definite predic-
tion. Heeding the first admonishment will not help with the problem of 
bewilderment, but heeding the latter obviously puts an end to it. 
As it turns out, the IPCC goes a long way towards committing itself to 
a full belief about the cause of climate change. In the first report, Working 
Group 1 offers the following summary of its findings:
We are certain of the following: … emissions resulting from human activities are 
substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases … 
These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an 
additional warming of the Earth’s surface. (IPCC 1990: xi)
This is said in the Executive Summary, which directs itself to political 
decision makers and the public at large. However, the commitment to 
full belief is something of an intellectual exaggeration. In the “supporting 
material” provided by Working Group 1, we read that, “Poor quantita-
tive understanding of low frequency climate variability (particularly on 
the 10–100 year time scale) leaves open the possibility that the observed 
warming is largely unrelated to the enhanced greenhouse effect.” (IPCC 
1990:254) There is, accordingly, a discrepancy between what some scien-
tists (at least) believe about the effect of greenhouse gas emissions and 
what those who penned the executive summary communicate to politi-
cians and the public. The formulation I quoted from in the “supporting 
material” is indicative of only partial belief in the greenhouse theory. Two 
hypotheses – an enhanced greenhouse effect and natural variability – 
appear to be good candidates for truth, contrary to what the IPCC states 
in the summary.
In the report of 2007, the summary of the contribution from Work-
ing Group 1 contains many formulations that signal, if not full belief, 
at least nearly full belief in the greenhouse theory. It is said, for exam-
ple, that “[m]ost of the observed increase in global average temperature 
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since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase 
in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” Moreover, it “is very 
unlikely that climate changes of at least the seven centuries prior to 
1950 were due to variability generated within the climate system alone.” 
(IPCC 2007:10 and 12) The IPCC goes as far as alleging that there is a 
chance of 9 in 10 that human activity is the cause of climate change. 
This, however, seems exaggerated in the light of what the scientific pro-
ceedings say. Qualifications and reservations are voiced. They have to 
do with the models that underlie the estimate I just cited. In particu-
lar, the role played by clouds and oceans in the causal chain between 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change remains to be sorted out 
(ibid.:592–593).
It appears, then, that the IPCC tones down scientific inconclusiveness 
about the cause of climate change. The results it reports are inconclusive. 
Epistemic considerations support only partial belief and we are closer 
to suspension of judgment than full belief. Yet, in statements that direct 
themselves to political authorities and the public, a nearly full belief is 
voiced.
Why does the IPCC speak with two tongues? I venture the hypoth-
esis2 that it does not confine its attention to epistemic considerations 
when it passes a judgment on the greenhouse theory before us, its non- 
scientific audience. Considerations of a practical nature enter the pic-
ture. They have to do with what can go wrong if we – or politicians who 
act on our behalf – adopt a climate policy that reflects false belief about 
the cause of climate change. Two errors, in particular, are conceiva-
ble. One is to take costly steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that 
actually have very little or no effect on the climate. Call this the error of 
redundancy: making (significant) sacrifices to no avail. The other error 
is to refrain from reductions in the false belief that anthropogenic emis-
sions are inconsequential, whereas they substantially affect the climate. 
Call this the error of complacency. On the face of it, the two errors are 
equally regrettable. The first consists in wasting resources that society 
2 It is inspired by an argument of Michael Bratman (1999:22–24). His thoughts are on other mat-
ters and I do not know whether my inspired use of them will be to his liking.
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might have put to good use, the second in wasting an opportunity to 
avert adversity. 
We have seen that the findings of the IPCC warrant a partial belief as 
to the effect that climate change will have unless reductions are under-
taken. This belief is close to suspension of judgment. Now, suppose sci-
entists are not reporting the result of their research to us, but to someone 
who is about to place a bet. Suppose their task is to enlighten a gambler 
about the value of two lottery-tickets: one says that cuts will stave off cli-
mate change and the other that they won’t. Suppose, moreover, that sci-
entists know that this gambler is not fully rational, but liable to make an 
unwise decision. Then they may reinterpret their task as a dual one: both 
telling the gambler about the risk of, respectively, redundancy and com-
placency, and helping her to make a rational choice. What, apart from 
doing their best on the first score, might they do to forestall irrationality? 
It is natural to think that the presentation of their findings might be more 
or less suited to the purpose of priming the gambler for a rational choice. 
Will it help, for example, to inflate the estimate of one or the other risk? 
No, because the error of redundancy and the error of complacency are 
equally undesirable. If the gambler bets on the need for cuts when cuts 
are redundant, she loses her money; ditto if she wagers that it is safe to 
abstain from cuts that are actually needed. In view of this, the best scien-
tists can do with a view to promoting rational choice on the part of the 
gambler, is to straightforwardly convey their findings to her. 
The predicament we – all of us, but political authorities in particular – 
are in differs from that of the gambler. From our perspective, there is an 
asymmetry in the costs of error. The alternatives of either cutting or not 
cutting emissions are not on a par when it comes to how badly things may 
go. The consequence of complacency is worse than that of redundancy. 
However adversely cuts in emissions will affect the economy of this or 
that country, the consequences of climate change are far worse, at least in 
certain parts of the world. Failing to make necessary cuts could be disas-
trous. In contrast, the risk of making cuts to no avail is worrying, but not 
nearly as much. So, at any rate, I assumed at the outset. 
In view of this, one would expect that scientists who let practical con-
siderations into their reasoning behave otherwise than they would have 
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done if they had only reckoned on epistemic considerations. If, in par-
ticular, they are concerned about imperfect rationality on our part, it will 
be a concern about complacency. Considering the asymmetry in the costs 
of error, redundancy is, in comparison, a lesser worry. 
In the case of the hypothetical gambler, I simply postulated that the 
hypothetical scientists worry about her lack of rationality. It will not do 
to argue this way when it comes to the way scientists in the IPCC behave 
towards us. There has to be some justification for assuming that they sus-
pect we may not be up to the task of making a wise decision. The justifica-
tion is not hard to find. On the one hand, the cost of cutting greenhouse 
gas emissions will be borne whether or not cuts do any good. On the other 
hand, the cost society will incur if cuts are needed but left undone lies in 
the future. This is a classic setting for myopia. The error of redundancy may 
make an impression that is out of proportion to the real cost of undertaking 
redundant cuts. It is apt to be the other way around with the cost of compla-
cency. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the IPCC ratch-
ets up the estimate of the risk that greenhouse gases cause climate change. 
Suppressing doubt is a kind of manipulation. The IPCC would have 
us believe that the development will definitely go in the wrong direc-
tion unless emissions of greenhouse gases are cut significantly, whereas 
inquiry indicates only that disaster may happen. They encourage a nearly 
full belief, in spite of the fact that the epistemic considerations warrant a 
partial belief that is closer to suspension of judgment.
I do not think such manipulation of belief is necessarily wrong. Sup-
pose people are prone to take uncertainty as an excuse for living danger-
ously. Suppose, moreover, that lecturing people on the folly of this attitude 
will not have much of an effect on their behavior. Neither assumption is 
far-fetched when, as in the case of climate change, it will be costly to deal 
effectively with the danger in question. In such a case, when people are 
dragging their feet, those who are aware of the danger at hand may be 
justified in covering up uncertainty in order to discourage indecisiveness 
in the face of danger. 
In practice, however, there is a problem. Manipulation of belief by 
scientists may easily turn out to be counterproductive. It is apt to push 
scientific debate in a direction that makes people less, rather than more, 
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prepared to do something about the danger. The root of the problem is 
that scientists rarely agree on matters relating to risk. When someone 
expresses greater confidence in their predictions than evidence permits, 
those who disagree will not remain silent. The scientific debate that fol-
lows is likely to be loud and livid, and as the heat turns up inside the 
scientific community, people on the outside may come to believe that dis-
agreement runs deeper than it actually does. Scientific communication 
that is aimed at covering up scientific inconclusiveness will rather con-
tribute to making a major issue out of it.
In the case of climate change, a large part of the public debate revolves 
around the question of whether or not things are certain to end in dis-
aster unless something drastic is done to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. This has set the stage for bickering and postponement of political 
decisions. Responsibility for this state of affairs lies largely with scientists 
who have used their position as public experts to argue that the green-
house theory is the only viable explanation of climate change. It is not, 
and scientists who subscribe to other theories have raised their voices in 
protest. As a result, scientific inconclusiveness has come to be perceived 
as a major problem and a good reason not to do anything before scientists 
agree – which, of course, is unlikely to happen soon.
Conclusion
Discord among scientists has not gone unnoticed among those who, for 
some reason or other, want to dismiss the dangers of climate change. They 
have been able to defend their position simply by pointing out that there 
is still disagreement among scientists. A telling illustration is a memo 
that came from the Republican Party in the United States, when George 
W. Bush was President. It was meant to back up the President’s resistance 
to greenhouse gas reductions, and it said:
Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, their 
views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to 
continue to make the lack of scientific conclusiveness a primary issue in the 
debate. (Quoted from Lanchester 2007:5)
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Scientists who try to pass the greenhouse theory as certified truth open 
the door to this kind of argumentation. They play into the hands of those 
who are struggling against reductions of greenhouse gas emissions, allow-
ing them to harp on about the margin of error in the greenhouse theory.
I shall close on a note of political engagement. Uncertainty is pro-
nounced and resilient even in the best parts of science, and scientists 
should not cover it up. They should rather acclimatize people to the idea 
that most of time, even the best estimate is an unsure estimate. The fact 
that we do not know for sure, but only suspect, that greenhouse gas emis-
sions are causing climate change is not a good excuse for inaction. 
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